Details
Realistic downstream consequences
These were not separately demonstrated with real secrets, but they follow from the validated behavior:
- The deploy directories (
.github/,.claude/,.cursor/,.codex/,.windsurf/) are project-tracked by convention, and the auto-generated.gitignoredoes not exclude them. - In automation that regenerates and commits agent context, the leaked files can be pushed without human review.
- A symlink target such as
/proc/self/environwould resolve to the APM process environment at install time.
Why this is security-relevant and not intended behavior
This is not just "a malicious package being malicious."
The codebase already contains the correct defense in BaseIntegrator.find_files_by_glob(), and that helper explicitly rejects symlinks, hardlinks, and containment escapes. InstructionIntegrator uses it. PromptIntegrator and AgentIntegrator do not.
The codebase also documents that preserving symlinks inside apm_modules/ is acceptable only because the links are supposed to remain inert unless a consumer tool follows them safely. Here, APM itself is the consumer tool that follows them unsafely.
That architectural asymmetry makes this look like an implementation oversight, not intended behavior.
Recommended fix
Route both affected finders through the existing safe helper.
# src/apm_cli/integration/prompt_integrator.py
def find_prompt_files(self, package_path: Path) -> list[Path]:
return self.find_files_by_glob(
package_path, "*.prompt.md", subdirs=[".apm/prompts"]
)
# src/apm_cli/integration/agent_integrator.py
def find_agent_files(self, package_path: Path) -> list[Path]:
files: list[Path] = []
files += self.find_files_by_glob(package_path, "*.agent.md")
files += self.find_files_by_glob(package_path, "*.chatmode.md")
files += self.find_files_by_glob(
package_path, "*.agent.md", subdirs=[".apm/agents"]
)
files += self.find_files_by_glob(
package_path, "*.md", subdirs=[".apm/agents"]
)
files += self.find_files_by_glob(
package_path, "*.chatmode.md", subdirs=[".apm/chatmodes"]
)
return files
Optional defense in depth
- In
copy_prompt,copy_agent,_write_codex_agent, and_write_windsurf_agent_skill, explicitly raise onsource.is_symlink()before reading. - Treat any symlink under a dependency's
.apm/tree as a security finding during scanning.
Regression test idea
Add unit tests that create a fixture package with symlinks under .apm/prompts/, .apm/agents/, and .apm/chatmodes/, then assert that the symlink entries are filtered out before any read occurs.
Example shape:
def test_symlink_under_apm_prompts_is_rejected(tmp_path):
pkg = tmp_path / "pkg"
(pkg / ".apm/prompts").mkdir(parents=True)
sentinel = tmp_path / "sentinel.txt"
sentinel.write_text("REGRESSION-SENTINEL")
(pkg / ".apm/prompts/leak.prompt.md").symlink_to(sentinel)
result = PromptIntegrator().find_prompt_files(pkg)
assert all(not p.is_symlink() for p in result)
assert not any(p.name == "leak.prompt.md" for p in result)
A second test should mirror the same pattern for AgentIntegrator.find_agent_files().