praisonai
Affected
- introduced
4.2.1, fixed4.6.59(ecosystem)
Fixed versions
4.6.59
Fix
- Fixed version
4.6.59pip install --upgrade praisonai==4.6.59
Advisory
Also known as: CVE-2026-57116, GHSA-892r-p3jq-jp24
PraisonAI: AgentOS remains unauthenticated after incomplete fix version and allows remote agent invocation
AgentOS remains unauthenticated after GHSA-pm96 patched version and allows remote agent invocation
Summary
PraisonAI's AgentOS FastAPI deployment surface remains unauthenticated in
current main and in releases after the published patched version forGHSA-pm96-6xpr-978x / CVE-2026-40151.
The public AgentOS advisory is published as an instruction-disclosure issue
with affected versions < 4.5.128 and patched version 4.5.128. However,v4.5.128, latest release v4.6.57, and current main still registerGET /api/agents and POST /api/chat without authentication. The chat route
directly calls agent.chat(request.message). No-auth and wrong-bearer requests
both execute the deployed agent.
This is broader than passive metadata disclosure. In any deployment where
AgentOS wraps agents with tools, private context, memory, API integrations, or
cost-bearing model calls, an unauthenticated reachable client can drive those
agents.
Affected Product
MervinPraison/PraisonAIpraisonaisrc/praisonai/praisonai/app/agentos.pysrc/praisonai-agents/praisonaiagents/app/config.pyGHSA-pm96-6xpr-978x / CVE-2026-40151Confirmed affected dynamically:
v4.5.126v4.5.128 (published patched version for GHSA-pm96-6xpr-978x)v4.6.9v4.6.10v4.6.56v4.6.572f9677abb2ea68eab864ee8b6a828fd0141612e1Static source review found the same unauthenticated route pattern and0.0.0.0 default in v4.2.1.
Suggested affected range: >= 4.2.1, <= 4.6.57.
Root Cause
AgentOSConfig / AgentAppConfig defaults the deployment host to all
interfaces and has no authentication fields:
name: str = "PraisonAI App"
host: str = "0.0.0.0"
port: int = 8000
api_prefix: str = "/api"
AgentOS._register_routes() registers public agent metadata and chat routes
without middleware, dependency, API key check, bearer-token check, or startup
fail-closed guard:
@app.get(f"{self.config.api_prefix}/agents")
async def list_agents():
return {"agents": [...]}
@app.post(f"{self.config.api_prefix}/chat", response_model=ChatResponse)
async def chat(request: ChatRequest):
...
response = agent.chat(request.message)
A wrong Authorization header is ignored because the route does not inspect it.
Current main also has a root-export bug where from praisonai import AgentOS
raises ImportError, but this does not mitigate the issue. The same class
remains reachable through from praisonai import AgentApp andfrom praisonai.app import AgentOS.
Why This Is Not Intended Behavior
PraisonAI's security documentation says API servers were hardened so anonymous
requests return 401 and default binding changed from 0.0.0.0 to127.0.0.1 after the prior unauthenticated API server class.
The API Server Authentication docs say bearer auth is enabled by default,
disabling auth is not recommended for production, and 0.0.0.0 should be used
only behind an authenticating proxy.
The local PoV includes a hardened sibling control for the generated deploy API
on current main. It returns:
401401200AgentOS remains outside that control plane and still accepts no-auth and
wrong-bearer /api/chat requests.
Local PoV
The PoV is local-only. It uses FastAPI's in-process test client, a stub agent,
and a temporary file side effect. It does not start a network listener, call an
LLM provider, or contact any external service.
Command:
env PYTHONPATH="artifacts/repos/praisonai-current/src/praisonai:artifacts/repos/praisonai-current/src/praisonai-agents" \
uv run --with fastapi --with httpx --with flask --with flask-cors \
--with pydantic --with typing-extensions --with rich --with python-dotenv \
submission-bundle/praisonai-prai-cand-007-agentos-incomplete-auth-fix/poc/prai_cand_007_agentos_incomplete_auth_fix.py \
--repo artifacts/repos/praisonai-current \
--label current-head
Current-head result summary:
{
"describe": "v4.6.57-4-g2f9677ab",
"head": "2f9677abb2ea68eab864ee8b6a828fd0141612e1",
"agentos_vulnerable": true,
"entrypoints": [
{
"entrypoint": "agentapp_alias",
"statuses": [200, 200, 200],
"side_effects": ["no-auth-marker", "wrong-bearer-marker"]
},
{
"entrypoint": "direct_agentos",
"statuses": [200, 200, 200],
"side_effects": ["no-auth-marker", "wrong-bearer-marker"]
}
],
"deploy_api_control": {
"control_passed": true,
"statuses": [401, 401, 200]
}
}
The three AgentOS statuses are for:
GET /api/agents;POST /api/chat;POST /api/chat.The side-effect list proves both unauthenticated chat requests invoked the
agent method.
Minimal inline reproducer:
from pathlib import Path
from tempfile import TemporaryDirectory
from fastapi.testclient import TestClient
from praisonai import AgentApp
from praisonaiagents import AgentOSConfig
class StubAgent:
name = "pov_agentos_agent"
role = "tester"
instructions = "private instruction marker"
def __init__(self, out):
self.out = out
def chat(self, message):
self.out.write_text(self.out.read_text() + message + "\n")
return "PRAI_CAND_007_AGENTOS_EXECUTED:" + message
with TemporaryDirectory() as tmp:
side_effect = Path(tmp) / "side_effects.txt"
side_effect.write_text("")
app = AgentApp(
agents=[StubAgent(side_effect)],
config=AgentOSConfig(host="0.0.0.0", port=8000),
)
client = TestClient(app.get_app())
assert client.get("/api/agents").status_code == 200
assert client.post("/api/chat", json={"message": "no-auth"}).status_code == 200
assert client.post(
"/api/chat",
headers={"Authorization": "Bearer definitely-wrong"},
json={"message": "wrong-bearer"},
).status_code == 200
assert side_effect.read_text().splitlines() == ["no-auth", "wrong-bearer"]
Version Sweep
| Target | Result |
| --- | --- |
| v4.5.126 | vulnerable |
| v4.5.128 | vulnerable |
| v4.6.9 | vulnerable |
| v4.6.10 | vulnerable |
| v4.6.56 | vulnerable; generated deploy API control returns 401/401/200 |
| v4.6.57 | vulnerable; generated deploy API control returns 401/401/200 |
| current 2f9677abb | vulnerable; generated deploy API control returns 401/401/200 |
Evidence files are retained locally under the bundle's evidence/ directory
and can be provided if useful.
Duplicate / Incomplete-Fix Notes
This report is related to GHSA-pm96-6xpr-978x / CVE-2026-40151. The
published advisory describes AgentOS instruction disclosure and lists4.5.128 as patched. It also mentions unauthenticated /api/chat as a chained
instruction-extraction path.
The current report should be treated as an incomplete fix / affected-range
correction with a broader demonstrated impact:
Critical Basis: CVSS v3 score 9.8, vector CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H
4.2.1, fixed 4.6.59 (ecosystem)4.6.59
4.6.59pip install --upgrade praisonai==4.6.59Fix commands are the export's own generic commands. Ojuju never runs them. Check them against your setup first.
Check your own computer: guard packages check
Source: PyPA Advisory Database · CC BY 4.0