Details
- the published patched version
v4.5.128still reproduces; - latest release
v4.6.57still reproduces; - current main still reproduces;
- the PoV proves unauthorized agent invocation and side effects, not only instruction disclosure.
This is distinct from private PRAI-CAND-003 / GHSA-x8cv-xmq7-p8xp, which
covers praisonaiagents.AgentTeam.launch() routes. This report coverspraisonai.app.AgentOS and AgentApp alias routes.
Impact
If an operator exposes an AgentOS app on a reachable interface, any client that
can reach it can:
- enumerate deployed agents through
GET /api/agents; - read agent names, roles, and instruction snippets;
- invoke the default agent or a named agent through
POST /api/chat; - trigger downstream tools, private context reads, memory accesses, API integrations, browser actions, or other side effects attached to the agent;
- consume model/API budget through repeated invocation.
The exact downstream impact depends on the deployed agents. The framework-level
boundary failure is that a production deployment surface exposes agent control
without authentication and defaults to binding on all interfaces.
Suggested Fix
Use the same security model already applied to generated API deployments:
- add authentication fields to
AgentOSConfig/AgentAppConfig; - default auth to enabled;
- default bind host to
127.0.0.1; - reject no-auth and wrong-bearer requests for
GET /api/agentsandPOST /api/chat; - fail closed for non-loopback binds unless auth is configured or an explicit unsafe development opt-out is set;
- avoid returning instruction text from unauthenticated metadata endpoints;
- add regression tests for no auth, wrong bearer, correct bearer, and external bind without auth.
Maintainers can either update GHSA-pm96-6xpr-978x with the corrected affected
range and broader impact or publish a separate incomplete-fix advisory.
Suggested Severity
Suggested severity: Critical.
The Critical score matches the unauthenticated agent-control model: network
attacker, low complexity, no privileges, no user interaction, and high
deployment-dependent impact when agents are connected to tools, private data,
or cost-bearing services. If maintainers score only a minimal no-tool demo
agent, the impact may be lower, but the current default framework behavior is
still unauthenticated agent invocation.