Details
Intended-Behavior Validation
PraisonAI's Async Jobs documentation describes webhook_url as the completion
callback URL for submitted jobs. The deploy API docs list webhooks as a key
feature and state that the async jobs API does not require authentication by
default, with authentication left to server deployment configuration.
The code also proves the intended safety boundary: both JobSubmitRequest andJob currently reject direct http://127.0.0.1:<port>/... webhook URLs. The
PoV does not rely on local webhooks being intentionally allowed; it demonstrates
that a blocked local target becomes reachable after the validation-to-use DNS
transition.
Impact
If an attacker can submit jobs to a PraisonAI Jobs API deployment and choosewebhook_url, they can cause the PraisonAI host to send POST requests to
loopback, private-network, or cloud metadata endpoints reachable from that host.
Practical impact includes:
- blind interaction with internal HTTP services;
- internal host/port reachability probing via timing and webhook error behavior;
- POSTing attacker-controlled job result payloads to internal APIs with weak request validation;
- cloud metadata interaction where metadata endpoints accept the request method and the deployment network permits access.
This report does not claim response-body disclosure, RCE, or live credential
theft without deployment-specific internal-service behavior. The SSRF primitive
is still security-relevant because webhook delivery crosses a network boundary
that current code explicitly tries to block.
Severity
Suggested severity: High for network-reachable Jobs API deployments where job
submission is unauthenticated or attacker-accessible.
If maintainers model the Jobs API as loopback-only or authenticated in the
affected deployment, severity may reasonably be reduced. I kept the primary
rating aligned with the prior Jobs webhook SSRF advisory because PraisonAI's
public docs state that authentication is not required by default and the same
webhook sink remains reachable.
Suggested Fix
- Move SSRF validation to the send path immediately before opening the outbound connection.
- Resolve all candidate addresses with
socket.getaddrinfo(), not only the first IPv4 answer fromgethostbyname(). - Reject loopback, private, link-local, multicast, reserved, unspecified, and cloud metadata address ranges for every resolved address.
- Pin the validated address to the actual connection, or use a guarded HTTP transport/proxy that validates the destination after DNS resolution and before connect.
- Consider making Jobs API authentication mandatory by default for non-loopback binds, or require explicit opt-in to unauthenticated job submission.
- Add regression tests for direct loopback rejection, DNS rebind from public to loopback, IPv6/private AAAA records with public A records, and allowed public webhooks.