Details
Actual Test Results
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LANGFLOW v1.7.3 UNAUTHENTICATED RCE - DEFINITIVE E2E TEST
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Version: Langflow 1.7.3
RUN 1: POST /api/v1/build_public_tmp/{id}/flow (NO AUTH)
HTTP 200 - Job ID: d8db19bf-a532-4f9d-a368-9c46d6235c19
*** REMOTE CODE EXECUTION CONFIRMED ***
canary: RCE-f0d19b36
hostname: kali
uid: 1000
whoami: aviral
id: uid=1000(aviral) gid=1000(aviral) groups=1000(aviral),...
uname: Linux 6.16.8+kali-amd64
RUN 2: POST /api/v1/build_public_tmp/{id}/flow (NO AUTH)
HTTP 200 - Job ID: d2e24f20-d707-4278-868c-583dd7532832
*** REMOTE CODE EXECUTION CONFIRMED ***
canary: RCE-6037a271
RUN 3: POST /api/v1/build_public_tmp/{id}/flow (NO AUTH)
HTTP 200 - Job ID: 5962244a-42af-4ef6-b134-a6a4adba5ab7
*** REMOTE CODE EXECUTION CONFIRMED ***
canary: RCE-4a796556
FINAL RESULTS
Total checks: 15
VULNERABLE: 15
SAFE: 0
RCE confirmed: 3/3 runs
Reproducible: YES (100%)
Impact
- Unauthenticated Remote Code Execution with full server process privileges
- Complete server compromise: arbitrary file read/write, command execution
- Environment variable exfiltration: API keys, database credentials, cloud tokens (confirmed in PoC: env_keys exfiltrated)
- Reverse shell access for persistent access
- Lateral movement within the network
- Data exfiltration from all flows, messages, and stored credentials in the database
Comparison with CVE-2025-3248
| Aspect | CVE-2025-3248 | This Vulnerability |
|--------|--------------|-------------------|
| Endpoint | /api/v1/validate/code | /api/v1/build_public_tmp/{id}/flow |
| Fix applied | Added Depends(get_current_active_user) | None -- NEW vulnerability |
| Root cause | Missing auth on code validation | Unauthenticated endpoint accepts attacker-controlled executable code via data param |
| Code execution via | validate_code() → exec() | create_class() → prepare_global_scope() → exec() |
| CISA KEV | Yes (actively exploited) | N/A (new finding) |
| Can simple auth fix? | Yes (and it was fixed) | No -- endpoint is *designed* to be unauthenticated; the data parameter must be removed |
Recommended Fix
Immediate (Short-term)
Remove the `data` parameter from build_public_tmp. Public flows should only execute their stored flow data, never attacker-supplied data:
@router.post("/build_public_tmp/{flow_id}/flow")
async def build_public_tmp(
*,
flow_id: uuid.UUID,
inputs: Annotated[InputValueRequest | None, Body(embed=True)] = None,
# REMOVED: data parameter -- public flows must use stored data only
...
):
In generate_flow_events → create_graph(), only the build_graph_from_db path should be reachable for unauthenticated requests:
async def create_graph(fresh_session, flow_id_str, flow_name):
# For public flows, ALWAYS load from database, never from user data
return await build_graph_from_db(
flow_id=flow_id,
session=fresh_session,
...
)