Advisory

PYSEC-2026-3919

Also known as: CVE-2026-54569, GHSA-jrw6-7x4q-w25j

Summary

senaite.core Vulnerable to Eval Injection and Missing Authorization

Details

Summary

An unauthenticated remote code execution vulnerability in the SENAITE JSON API allows any network-reachable attacker to execute arbitrary Python on the Zope worker process via a two-request anonymous chain. The /@@API/update route is reachable to anonymous callers and runs eval() on attacker-controlled input before any permission check fires.

This is a different code path from the eval() in the calculations module: no authenticated account of any kind is required.

Details

The vulnerability is the chain of two independent flaws. Either fix alone breaks the unauthenticated chain, but the eval sink remains exploitable by any authenticated user with write access to a RecordsField, so both fixes are needed.

1. Missing `AccessJSONAPI` gate on JSON API write routes (CWE-862). The route at `src/bika/lims/jsonapi/update.py:45-165` does not enforce the senaite.core: Access JSON API permission upfront. Compare with the sibling `create.py:179-182`, which does:

if not getSecurityManager().checkPermission(AccessJSONAPI, parent):
    raise Unauthorized(...)

The check is present on create and absent on update, update_many, remove, doActionFor, doActionFor_many, and getusers. The underlying @@API view is registered by plone.jsonapi.core at `browser/configure.zcml:8-13` with permission="zope2.View", which is granted to Anonymous on the Plone Site root.

When an obj_uid is supplied, the route resolves the target through uid_catalog and brain.getObject(). The catalog brain walks the parent path with unrestrictedTraverse and applies restrictedTraverse only on the final segment, so the per-object View permission is enforced on the target. The chain is reachable to anonymous because bika_setup is anonymous-readable on a stock Plone Site (the View permission is acquired from the Plone Site root, which grants View to Anonymous by default).

2. `eval()` on `RecordsField` / `RecordField` values inside `set_fields_from_request` (CWE-95). Once an object has been resolved, `set_fields_from_request` in `jsonapi/__init__.py:199-252` iterates the request fields. For any field of type RecordsField or RecordField, the helper runs eval(value) on the raw request string at line 240, before the field mutator and its write_permission check execute:

elif fieldtype in ['senaite.core.browser.fields.records.RecordsField',
                   'senaite.core.browser.fields.record.RecordField']:
    try:
        value = eval(value)
    except Exception:
        logger.warning(
            "JSONAPI: " + fieldname + ": Invalid "
            "JSON/Python variable")
        return []

The eval runs in the Zope worker process with full Python builtins available, so a payload such as __import__('os').popen('id').read() executes arbitrary system commands. The transaction savepoint inside update.py rolls back ZODB writes when the mutator subsequently fails, but Python side effects (subprocess, urllib calls, file I/O outside ZODB) have already happened and are not reverted.

The same eval() pattern is also present in the field setters at `record.py:253-262` and `records.py:135-143`.

Anonymous UID discovery. The bika_setup object exposes two RecordsField-typed fields: RejectionReasons and IDFormatting. Its UID is published anonymously by Plone's standard `@@uuid` view:

GET /senaite/bika_setup/@@uuid HTTP/1.1
HTTP/1.1 200 OK
Content-Type: text/plain

8dbc161fa9f74aa4ad6e76eb1934518a

Origin. Both flaws predate the SENAITE fork. The eval() sink was introduced in `d7bf2d4507` (2013-09-04) and the unchecked update route in `be3d8cc916` (2013). Both remain present on the current 2.x development tip.

Suggested fixes

Fix 1: add `AccessJSONAPI` check to every state-changing route in src/bika/lims/jsonapi/, mirroring the existing check in create.py. An audit of every IRouteProvider in `configure.zcml` is in scope.

# src/bika/lims/jsonapi/update.py
from AccessControl import getSecurityManager
from zExceptions import Unauthorized
from senaite.core.permissions import AccessJSONAPI

def update(self, context, request):
    if not getSecurityManager().checkPermission(AccessJSONAPI, context):
        raise Unauthorized("You don't have permission to update via JSONAPI")
    savepoint = transaction.savepoint()
    ...

Fix 2: replace `eval()` with `json.loads()`. The data shape stored in RecordField and RecordsField is a JSON-compatible dict / list of dicts. Parsing as JSON is sufficient and removes the code-execution primitive entirely:

# src/bika/lims/jsonapi/__init__.py
import json

elif fieldtype in ['senaite.core.browser.fields.records.RecordsField',
                   'senaite.core.browser.fields.record.RecordField']:
    try:
        value = json.loads(value)
    except (ValueError, TypeError):
        logger.warning("JSONAPI: %s: invalid JSON value", fieldname)
        return []

Apply the same change at `record.py:253-262` and `records.py:135-143`.

Defense in depth: re-enable Plone's CSRF protection. The audited release ships with class ISenaiteCore(IDisableCSRFProtection) at `src/senaite/core/interfaces/__init__.py:30`, which disables plone.protect's automatic CSRF write-detection on every request handled by the SENAITE browser layer. Removing the inheritance does not affect this unauthenticated chain but closes several authenticated CSRF chains.

PoC

Tested against the unmodified upstream Docker image senaite/senaite:v2.6.0. No source-code modification, no buildout overrides, no reverse proxy. PASSWORD is set to a non-default value to demonstrate that the chain works without the admin:admin Docker fallback.

Severity

Critical Basis: CVSS v3 score 9.8, vector CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H

Dates

Published
2026-09-10 09:44 UTC
Modified
2026-09-10 12:15 UTC

Affected packages and fixes

senaite-core

PyPI · All systems

Affected

  • introduced 2.0.0, last affected 2.6.0 (ecosystem)

Fixed versions

None listed

Fix

No fixed version is listed.

Fix commands are the export's own generic commands. Ojuju never runs them. Check them against your setup first.

Check your own computer: guard packages check

View this record on OSV.dev

Source

Source: PyPA Advisory Database · CC BY 4.0

Sources & licences