Details
DNS rebinding read-back
The attacker-controlled rebind.lab URL is accepted by web_crawl, and the PraisonAI response contains the internal canary response body.
<img width="1543" height="785" alt="01-DNS-Rebind-Burp-Readback" src="https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/e86e95dd-3d3a-4bef-b1c6-cb897234a212" />
DNS rebinding runtime evidence
The runtime log shows rebind.lab first resolving to an allowed/public IP during validation (guard-pass), then resolving to an internal Docker IP during the actual fetch (fetch-hit). The internal canary receives GET /secret from the PraisonAI container.
<img width="1654" height="828" alt="02-DNS-Rebind-DNS-Log-And-Internal-Hit" src="https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/f1d28046-de34-48f0-9bee-bbe26e598d5f" />
Redirect-based SSRF read-back
The attacker-controlled redirector URL is accepted by web_crawl. PraisonAI follows the redirect and returns the internal canary response body containing PRAISONAI_INTERNAL_SECRET_CANARY_7f3a91.
<img width="1540" height="772" alt="03-Redirect-Burp-Readback" src="https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/79eec159-4b9f-44be-a9eb-b15aba35ead8" />
Redirect chain runtime evidence
The controlled redirector returns 302 -> http://internal-canary:8081/secret, and the internal canary receives GET /secret, confirming that the server-side client followed the redirect into the internal network.
<img width="1637" height="894" alt="04-Redirect-Internal-Hit-Log" src="https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/1c503e30-9d01-4d32-8658-497f755a969e" />
Reproduction assets
The attached archive contains the local Docker runtime used to reproduce the issue with controlled canary services only. It does not contain real secrets, real cloud metadata access, or third-party API keys.
Impact
SSRF against internal/loopback/cloud-metadata endpoints with disclosure of internal HTTP responses (read-back) to the attacker. Bypasses the project's SSRF protection on every fetch backend.
Suggested remediation
- Resolve the host once, reject all returned records that are private/loopback/link-local/ULA/CGNAT/metadata, then connect to that exact validated IP (pin it; send the original
Host). Do not let the HTTP client / browser re-resolve. - Apply the same validation + IP pinning to every backend (httpx, urllib fallback, crawl4ai) and every redirect hop.
- Disable automatic redirect following (or cap + re-validate each hop with pinning).
- Treat IPv4-mapped IPv6, decimal/octal/hex IPs, and CGNAT/non-global ranges as unsafe.